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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
FRANK RIGGLE and
GENEVA H. RIGGLE,
his wife,
Plaintiffs and
Respondents,
vs.
DAINES MANUFACTURING
COMPANY, a partnership,
D. R. DAINES, R. M. DAINES
and J. NORMAN DAINES,
Defendants and
Appellants.

Case No.
11629

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE
Plaintiffs sued on a promissory note and in defense, the Defendants pleaded usury. (R 1-2, 27, 28).
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the Court. From a judgment for the Plaintiffs against the Appellants and
Defendants DAINES MANUFACTURING COMPANY, a partnership, D. R. DAINES, and J. NORMAN DAINES, appeal. (R 46-49)
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek a reversal of the judgment in
their favor, as a matter of law. (R 56)
1

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 8, 1954, Defendants borrowed $10,
000.00, payable in five years, with interest at the ,
rate of 6 % per annum. Simultaneously with the loan, '
Defendants entered into a written agreement, which
has been lost or destroyed, with the Plaintiffs to employ Frank Riggle for a period of five years at the
rate of $150.00 a month, a total of $9,000.00, which
was an additional consideration for the loan, a required inducement for its making. (Exhibit P-3, R
75, Exhibit D-7, R 114-115, 121, 77, 79-81, 94-95)
A few months later, on January 18, 1955, the
Defendants organized a corporation, merged their
business therein, and the corporation assumed the
obligations of the note and employment contract and
made payments on both. '!'hereafter, on July 1st,
1955, the corporation, as the substituted employer,
entered into another written contract on the same
terms and conditions as the contract with the partnership, for the remaining four years of the fiveyear period. (R 105, Exhibit D-7, Exhibit P-2, R 73,
Exhibit D-4, R 82, Exhibits P-5 and P-6, R 97)
Prior to incorporation, the Defendants paid
$450.00 on the note (Exhibit P-2, R 73) and $600.00
on the employment contract (Exhibit P-4 and P-5,
R 97), and after incorporation, the corporation paid
$1,731.78 on the note (Exhibit P-2, R 73) and $3,·
350.00 on the contract (Exhibit P-4 and P-5, R 97).
The Defendant Partnership and the successor
2

corporation was in business at Logan, manufacturing and selling store display appliances, to-wit display racks for bolted and rolled fabric materials, and
the Plaintiff, Frank Riggle, approximately 60 years
old, was engaged in the business of sharpening saws
under the name of "Overnight Saw Service" at Ogden, Utah, (R 105, 66) which required all of his time,
six days a week. (R 100-101)
The Defendants were in serious financial circumstances, were under-financed and limited to
short-term loans, and they were unable to borrow
money with which to pay their current obligations,
which at that time, were approximately $10,000.00.
These facts were well-known by the Respondent Riggle. Mr. Riggle had these facts verified by his nephew, an accountant. (R 106, 116, 67, 68, 69, 75-76)
The Defendants approached Riggle initially
with the proposition of purchasing stock in the corporation to be formed, which Mr. Riggles considered
and declined. ( R 109)
Mr. Riggle demanded a bonus for the making of
the loan, a doubling of his money, and various methods were discussed, involving 5 % of the gross profits,
a sweeping out of the Defendants' place of business
occasionally at Logan, Utah. However, they finally
agreed to a five-year consultation agreement, as
mentioned, to accomplish this purpose. (R 76, 77,
78-79, 110-112, 121)
All parties felt that the Defendants were on the
3

verge of prosperity because of favorable negotiations
with J. C. Penney Co. for an approved listing of their
product. (R 116-119)
Mr. Riggle had been advised by his accountant
nephew that the Defendants had a high potential for
success. (R 69)
The ground was fertile for a usurious contract.
The inducement for such a contract was not one-sided
but was mutual. With the employment contract Mr.
Riggle would double his $10,000.00 in five years
(Exhibit P-3, R 73). With the pressing creditors out
of the way and the J.C. Penney listing accomplished,
the partnership believed it would be a thriving and
profitable business.
Plaintiff Riggle did not have $10,000.00 available; only $3,500.00, and he had to borrow $6,500.00
from his bank to complete the transaction. (R 70)
Riggle sharpened Defendants' saws they used
in their business, for which he was separately paid.
(R 84)

The employment agreement was for a five-year
term. Mr. Riggle was to receive $150.00 per month,
and he was required to make himself available for
consultation during business hours at his office in
Ogden and at the Defendants' office in Logan. The ,
agreement provided that he would be paid an additional $50.00 per day for any time that exceeded ,
three days in any month. (Exhibit D-7)
4

Mr. Riggle had no talent or business experience
that would be of any value to the Defendants. He
knew nothing whatsoever about their business. His
business experience, while varied, was very limited.
He was not an Engineer, and his College training was
limited to a few weeks' course in forestry. (R 64-66,
85-87)
Although the Plaintiffs assert the employment
agreement was entered into in the month of August,
1954, subsequent to the note, they agree that Riggle,
before being placed on the Defendants' pay roll as of
September 1, 1954, worked two or three months for
nothing (R 94-95) and that Defendants agreed, during the negotiations for the loan, to employ Riggle
as an inducement for its making. ( R 79-81)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
PROMISSORY NOTE WAS NOT VOID BECAUSE OF USURY AS THE EVIDENCE
ESTABLISHED AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT
THE TRANSACTION WAS USURIOUS

The Note was executed and delivered on July 8,
1954, and is governed by the law then in effect, which
made usurious contracts void. 15 - 1- 6 U.C.A. 1953
with foot notes. Also see 44 - 0 - 6 U.C.A. 1943. 15 1- 6 U.C.A. 1953 Annotated, with foot notes, reads:
"All bonds, bills, notes, assurances, conveyances stock, pledges, mortgages and deeds
of trust, and all other contracts and securities
whatsoever, and all deposits of goods or other
5

things whatsoever, whereon or whereby there
shall be reserved or taken or secured, or agreed
to be reserved or taken or secured, any greater
sum or greater value for a loan or forbearance
of any money, goods or things in action that
as above prescribed shall be void. Section 440-6, U.C.A., 1943"
"Repeal. This Section (L. 1907, Ch. 46,
Sec. 5; C.L. 1907, Sec. 1241 x3; C.L. 1917, Sec.
3324; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 44-0-6) relating to
the voiding of usurious contracts and securities, was repealed by laws 1955 Ch. 21, Sec. 2."
We recognize the Court will not reverse the Trial
Court's findings and judgment if there is substantial
evidence to support them, and that positive testimony
of witnesses believed by the Trial Court is ordinarily
regarded as sufficient to compel affirmance of Trial
Court's findings, but it is not necessarily so under all
circumstances. If the evidence in the light of attendant circumstances and countervailing testimony,
and if, when so viewed, it appears so clearly and
palpably unreasonable that no fact trier acting fairly
and reasonably could accept it, then it must be rejected as a matter of law, and in fact determined otherwise by the appellant court. This is particularly so
where the testimony in question was that of witnesses
who had vital personal interest in the controversy.
Seybold vs. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 121 Utah 61,
239 Pac. 2d 17 4; Continental Bank and Trust Co. vs.
Stewart, 4 Utah 2d 228, 291 Pac. 2d 890; 9 Wigmore
Evidence, 3rd ed., Sec. 2494.
In Continental Bank and Trust Co. vs. Stewart,
6

supra, in an Opinion written by Chief Justice Crockett, the Court reversed the findings of the Trial
Court, and in doing so said :
"While it is true that the tstimony of a
witness such as Mr. Cheney would ordinarily
be regarded as sufficient to compel the affirmance of the trial court's finding, that is not
necessarily so under all circumstances. Defend ant is correct in arguing that even though the
testimony standing alone might be sufficient
to support a finding, it must always be appraised in the light of all the attendant circumstances and countervailing testimony. If when
so viewed, it appears so clearly and palpably
unreasonable that no fact trier acting fairly
and reasonably could accept it, then it must be
rejected as a matter of law, and the fact determined otherwise. This is particularly so here
where Mr. Cheney had such a vital personal
interest in the controversy, since it obviously
would be greatly to his advantage if he could
fix upon Mr. Stewart the responsibility of paying this large unsecured personal debt."
The evidence, in the light of attendant circumstances, reasonably and clearly established as a matter of law that the employment contract was an inducement for the $10,000.00 loan and rendered the
loan usurious and void, irrespective of whether the
employment agreement was entered into at the time
of the execution and delivery of the Note or a few
weeks later, as Riggle testified that the employment
contract, which extended over a five-year period at
the rate of $150.00 per month, was entered into pur7

suant to the Defendants' promise to do so in consid·
eration of his making the loan. This is undisputed.
CR 79-81)
The rule is that, where an agreement is finally
consummated subsequent to the making of the loan
to give usury, such, nevertheless, renders the loan
usurious, where made pursuant to a promise made
prior to or at the time of the making of the loan.

Grann'is vs. Stevens, 111 N.E. 263 (N.Y.); Conr
nor Airlines Inc. vs. Aviation Credit Corporation,
280 F. 2d, 895 (5th Cir.)
In Grann'is vs. Stevens, supra, the Court held
that an employment contract entered into as an inducement for a loan a week or ten days subsequent to
the making of the loan and pursuant to a promise
eleven months prior to the loan was usurious. The
Court said:
"There was evidence that the loan was
usurious. About eleven months before it was
made and during plaintiff's suspension from
the Stock Exchange, a memorandum in writing was delivered between the plaintiff and
the brother of the defendants, which provided,
inter alia, that if plaintiff was not reinstated
in the Stock Exchange within the two months
next following, he would sell his membership
"and lend the proceeds thereof to Mr. Stevens,
to be employed in his stock exchange business
on terms to be later agreed upon, which will
return Mr. Grannis not less than $10,000 a
year." The moneys loaned were avails of the
sale there provided for. The note was "with in8

terest at 6 per cent per annum." About a week
or ten days after the loan was made, the brother and the plaintiff entered into an agreement in writing which provided that the plaintiff should be employed by the former and be
paid $533 each month. Such sum was "to make
up the balance" of $10,000 per annum, unpaid
by the interest at 6 per centum per annum
upon the amount of business he brought in.
The plaintiff did not render any substantial
service as an employee to the brother or his
firm. The brother testifield, without contradiction, that he agreed to pay the plaintiff
$10,000 a year for the use of his money in the
firm, for the $60,000 he had in as capital; that
plaintiff was supposed to draw at the rate of
$933.33 each month, or $10,000 a year, and
that the agreement to pay him $533 a month
grew out of his having loaned the money. The
plaintiff was paid for a period of six or seven
months following upon the loan, pursuant to
the agreements. Those facts permitted the trial
court to decide that when the note was given,
the agreement between the borrower and lender was that there should be taken for the loan
of the money interest at a rate exceeding $6
upon $100 for one year, and that the note was
therefore void. General Business Law (Consol. Laws, c.20) paragraphs 370-373. A transaction of the character of the agreement of employment between the brother and the plaintiff
may be a mere device or subterfuge to conceal
usury and be assailed as and found to be such.
If the court can see that the real transaction
was the loan or forbearance of money at usurious interest, its plain and imperative duty is
to so declare and hold the security void ... "
(Emphasis added).
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And in Connor Airlines Inc. vs. Aviation Credit
Corporation, supra, a financing agreement which
was not usurious when made was held to have been
rendered usurious by its extension in conjunction
with the subsequent amendment of a contemporaneous contract with a person other than the lender,
which was intended as a device to evade the usury
statute. The extension agreement was pursuant to the
provisions in the original contract and entered into
approximately three months subsequent. The Court
said:
"Where there is an intent on the part of a
lender to make a loan or to extend a maturity
for a greater profit than is permitted by law,
the transaction is stained with usury even
though it is cast in a form which was designed
to give it a cloak of apparent legality. Courts
do not permit the use of design or device to
evade the purpose of the usury laws. Griffin
vs. Kelly, Fla., 92 So. 2d 515; Beacham vs.
Carr, 122 Fla. 736; 166 So. 456. The amount
of a bonus exacted in connection with financing will be regarded as interest in determining
whethe1· the usury law has been violated, and
this is true whether the bonus inures to the
benefit of the lender, the agent of the lender,
or to the benefit of another. Speler vs. Monnah
Park Block Co., Fla., 84 So. 2d 697; Stoutamire vs. North Florida Loan Association, 152
Fla. 321, 11 So. 2d 570; Richter Jewelry Co.
vs. Schweinert, 125 Fla. 199, 169 So. 760; Hopkins vs. Otto, 118 Fla. 865, 160 So. 203. The
fact that Smith Aircraft and Aviation Credit
are separate corporate entities does not prevent the financing bonus from being treated
10

as a usurious exaction in view of the relationship, through L.B. Smith, of the two companies."
In taking into consideration that Riggle admits
that he was placed on the payroll on September 1,
1954, and that prior thereto he worked for two or
three months for nothing and the subsequent written
agreement of July 1, 1955, with the corporation for
four years, such is in line with the Defendants' testimony that, at the time of the execution of the note,
there was a written agreement for five years. It was
not a mere coincidence that the employment contract
and the payment of the note ran for the same period
- five years. Riggle testified:
"A.

Q.
A.

Along with the rest of the contract, you
understand. We didn't have a contract
agreement between this contract was
drawn.
You talked?
That is right. I worked for them two or
three months for nothing.... " (R 94-95)

We urge that it is unbelievable that Riggle, a
60-year-old man, would have parted with $10,000,
$6,500 of which he had to borrow, without the bonus
arrangement being reduced to writing and would
have placed himself at the mercy of anyone in serious
financial difficulty. He would not have left the $9,000
bonus to chance. ( R 70).
However, as we pointed out, it makes no difference when the employment contract was entered into,
11

as it was agreed, prior to the making of the loan and
as an inducement for the making of the loan, that
such an agreement would be entered into.
An obligation, once usurious, is always usurious
as long as its original existence continues and the
transaction is not cured although a third party is
substituted for and continues to pay the usury. The
Court so held in the companion case of Riggles vs.
Daines Manufacturing Co. 20 Utah 2d, 391, 438 Pac.
2d. 808, also see Asperita vs. California Trust Company, 322 Pac. 2d 265; W estrnan vs. Dye, (Calif.) 4
Pac. 2d 134; Richardson vs. Foster, 170 Pac. 321
(Wash.); Fidelity Security Corporation vs. Vrugman, 1 Pac. 2d 131.
Riggle knew that the Defendants were having
serious financial problems, were up to their ears in
debt, were desperate for money and unable to borrow
money with which to pay their current obligations
(R 67, 75-76) and this situation he took advantage
of. In this regard he testified:

"Q.

A.
Q.

A.
Q.

Well, they did tell you all this time, they
were in trouble with their debts? I think
you said that.
That is right. That is right.
As a matter of fact I think you said they
were in debt up to their ears?
That is right. That was what Rendell told
me. He said, "We are in up to here ( indicating). We are sunk."
They also said they were having trouble
12

getting money to pay their debts, didn't
they?
A. Well, I don't know as that was discussed.
I assumed that, of course, but I don't
know as I asked them any such question,
if that came up. I supposed they wouldn't
have been in if it hadn't been a dire necessity. I just assumed, I don't know." (R
75-76)
Riggles recognized that, because of the Defendants' dire need for money, this presented them with
a "dream of a chance". He testified:
"A.

That potential wasn't mentioned at that
time at all. I mean that it wasn't discussed, you understand. We had worked that
out, and that was between my nephew and
Richard Potts and I about the potential,
and I figured this, there was three young
men with an exclusive feature. I just figured it was a dream of a chance." ( R 78)

There is no question that the purported employment of Riggle for an approximate five-year period
at the rate of $150.00 a month or a total of $9,000.00
was an inducement for the making of the $10,000.00
loan, a bonus to him. Riggle testified:
"Q.

A.

As a matter of fact it was agreed that
you would - if you loaned them the $10,000.00 that they would put you on the payroll, wasn't it?
Eventually, yes. Not at a set time or when,
nothing. It was futuristic, you understand. This was a general discussion and
nothing definite was determined at that
13

time and they didn't put me on the payroll
at that time.
Q. And they told you or said that the way t:-0
put this something additional to paying
you the $10,000.00 would be to put you
on the payroll, would be the way to handle
it?
A. It wasn't nothing at all. He said that
would be what it probably was.
Q. The way to pay you more than $10,000.00
was to put you on the payroll?
A. More than what?
Q. More than the 6 per cent interest. I mean,
what you were to get on the payroll would
not be credited on the note?
A. That is right.
Q. That would be an additionalA. That is right.
Q. So in order to get you more there than
your $10,000.00 at 6 per cent you would
be put on the payroll to make it more than
that, and you would get $150.00?
A. That is right.
Q. It was a separate deal as, if and when, and
they agreed at that time, that the note was
signed, that you would be put on the payroll, didn't they?
A. Eventually yes.
Q. But at that time they said, "We will put
you on the payroll?"
A.

Yes, that is right.
14

Q.
A.

And they did put you on the payroll?
That is right. Not at that time, however.
They didn't put me on the payroll at that
time." (R 79-80)
and in this respect, Riggle further testified:
What it finally ended up in you were supposed to get $150.00 per month?
A. That is right.
Q. From the payroll, and not to be credited
on the note?
A. That is right.
Q. This has been discussed prior to lending
the money, and it was discussed at the
time the note was signed?
A. Before, during and after; yes, sir." (R
81)
At the time of the loan, Riggle was engaged in
the business of "sharpening saws" at Ogden, which
required his entire attention, for, as his wife testified
on direct examination, because of their business they
could only go to Logan on Sundays. She said:
"Q.

"Q.

A.

Q.
A.

All right. Now, did you take any trips to
Logan?
Well, I say. Yes. Of course, we were free
only on Sundays.
Did you take many Sundays up to Logan?
Yes." (R 100-101)

Mr. Riggle, the saw sharpener, except as such,
never performed any service for the Defandants, nor
15

was it intended he should, and while his contract of
employment provided that he was to give advice in
in business and in metal engineering, neither his experience nor training qualified him as a business or
metal engineering consultant. Riggle's business experience, while varied, was very limited. He was not
an Engineer, metal or other wise, nor did Defendants' business require one. His college training was
limited to a short course in forestry. He knew absolutely nothing about Defendants' business. Yet, according to the employment agreement, Defendants
agreed to pay him $150.00 a month for five years, for
consultant advice 45 miles away at Ogden, with the
provision of an additional $50.00 a day for each day
spent in Logan in excess of three days a month when
his services were required there. ('R 64-66, 85-87,
Exhibit D-7).
In this respect, in part Riggle testified :
ness, he said :

"Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.

A.

And other than your enterprise, as your
mining interest, have you ever been in any
other kind of business?
No.
Have you operated a business?
No. Employment is all, that is right.
Other than your saw. Well, let me ask you
this. On the mining, were you on a salary
or were youN o, I was working for myself. When I
worked in the Lake Shore Mine, I worked
16

on a salary, of course. I was sharpening
steel and doing blacksmith work.
Q. And you did some prospecting work too, I
believe?
A. Yes, I prospected a great deal. (R 85)
An again, as to his limited business experience
and that he knew nothing of the Defendants' business:
"Q. And other than that, that was your business experience in the business world.
Outside of that you - and your saws, you
have been on salary all your life?
A. That is right.
Q. Now, did you know anything about the
manufacure of display equipment?
A. Nothing at all, other than seeing the products and having seen them in the plant
up there.
Q. Did you ever have any experience selling
anything like this?
A. No.
Q. You didn't have any experience with the
Daines people in selling for them, did you?
A. No, sir. (R 86-87)
Actually, the Plaintiffs and Defendants merely
maintained a social relationship. They visited back
and forth with each other occasionally, had dinner
and went boating together. (R 115)
It is inconceivable, except for the purpose of providing the Plaintiff with a bonus for the loan, and to
evade the usury laws, at Plaintiff's request, that De17

fendants would obligate themselves in such amounts,
for a five-year period, for such non-professional services, especially when they could get qualified professional advice from personnel at Utah State University and others, on a problem basis and without obligating themselves on a long-term, five-year contract.
When Riggle was pressed, on cross-examination,
he could relate only three instances where he gave socalled advice on matters of so-called importance,
namely ( 1) about the lawn mower business, a business in which he was engaged, and then for the purpose of his sharpening lawn mowers for them; ( 2)
the marine business, a business foreign to him and in
which he had no experience; and ( 3) he complained
about the Defendant's $3,000 office, which turned
out to be an area of about 15 feet by 15 feet partitioned from the manufacturing area because of noise. (R
91-92, 93, 98, 125)
That Plaintiff's and Defendants' employment
agreement, mutually arrived at, was a sham and a
device to evade the usury laws is apparent from a
mere cursory reading of Riggle's testimony, and
establishes this as a matter of law.

18

CONCLUSIONS
1. The evidence by clear and convincing proof,
without contradiction, established that the $10,000.00
loan was conditioned by the Plaintiff receiving a
bonus of $9,000.00. To effect this purpose a spurious
employment contract for the purpose of evading the
usury laws of this State was entered into, which rendered the transaction usurious and void.

2. In the light of Riggle's testimony that he
worked two or three months for nothing before he received his first salary payment on September 15,
1954, there is no question that the employment agreement was entered into at the time of the making of
the note.
3. That Riggle did not perform any service, nor
was it intended he do so, and that the employment
agreement of $9,000.00 was a bonus for the making
of the loan of $10,000.00 and a device to evade the
usury laws, and the Note is void.
4. That whether or not the contract of employment was entered into on July 8, 1954, or in the month
of August the same year, or by a subsequent written
agreement on July 1, 1955, the loan was nevertheless
usurious, and this is so whether the Court considers
the employment was for a four- or five-year period,
for the employment contract was a bonus and an inducement for the loan, no matter when entered into.
We urge that the evidence in this case, even when
19

limited to the testimony of the Plaintiffs Riggle,
establishes as a matter of law that the transaction
was usurious and that this Court should reverse the
judgment of the District Court and direct it to enter
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and J udgment in favor of the Appellants.
Respect£ ully submitted,
RICHARD J. O'ROURKE,
L. DELOS DAINES,
Attorneys for AppeUants
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